アフリカ食料支援、多収穫コメ開発へ…政府

「アフリカ食料支援、多収穫コメ開発へ…政府」

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/news/20090726-OYT1T00047.htm

アフリカの食料確保を支援するため、アフリカの気候に適し、多くの収穫が期待できる品種の開発、生産や流通の支援を行うとのこと。今後５年間で約２０００万ドル（約１９億円）を支出するんだそうな。

　
普及のためには、
アジアでの普及のプロセスが役に立ちそうだが、
アフリカで肥料普及がなかなか進まない理由を明らかにしようとした
こんな論文も役に立ちそう。

http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/4281

Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, and Jonathan Robinson
"Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Kenya"

Abstract
While many developing-country policymakers see heavy fertilizer subsidies as critical to raising agricultural productivity, most economists see them as distortionary, regressive, environmentally unsound, and argue that they result in politicized, inefficient distribution of fertilizer supply. We model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertilizer, and assume some are stochastically present-biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias. Even when relatively patient, such farmers may procrastinate, postponing fertilizer purchases until later periods, when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer. Consistent with the model, many farmers in Western Kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profitable fertilizer investments, but they do invest in response to small, time-limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer (free delivery) just after harvest. Later discounts have a smaller impact, and when given a choice of price schedules, many farmers choose schedules that induce advance purchase. Calibration suggests such small, time-limited discounts yield higher welfare than either laissez faire or heavy subsidies by helping present-biased farmers commit to fertilizer use without inducing those with standard preferences to substantially overuse fertilizer.

Top researchersによる最近のField experimentの論文は、
現実を説明可能なTheoryがあることが、
ほぼStandardになりつつある感じ。